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CONSIDERATIONS 
CHEN MENG LAM 
In what was described as ‘one of the most difficult cases’ that had come 
before it, the Singapore Court of Appeal in ACB v Thomson Medical Pte 
Ltd (‘ACB’) recognised, for the first time, the loss of genetic affinity as an 
independent head of loss that would allow a plaintiff to recover damages in 
a claim for wrongful fertilisation. In ACB, the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the claim for upkeep costs of raising the child from birth to maturity, and 
instead identified the loss of genetic affinity as the real harm for which 
damages should be awarded to compensate for the mistaken use of sperm 
from an unknown third party. An interesting aspect of ACB was how the 
Court of Appeal grappled with policy considerations as the basis for its 
decision. The influence of policy considerations in ACB raises the question 
of whether the decision runs contrary to the long-standing view that there is 
little room for public policy reasoning in private law adjudication. In this 
article, the author argues that the Court of Appeal’s decision in ACB was 
correctly made as it rightly embraced policy considerations in rejecting the 
upkeep claim and focused on the value of biological relationships in 
recognising an interest in genetic affinity.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Awarding compensation for loss of ‘genetic affinity’ was unprecedented until 
the landmark case of ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd (‘ACB’)1 in Singapore. 
In that case the plaintiff sued for compensation for raising a child who had not 
been fathered by her husband, an eventuality brought about by the defendants’ 
negligence while carrying out an in-vitro fertilisation (‘IVF’) process. The 
                                                 
 Juris Doctor (Ohio State), Senior Lecturer, Singapore University of Social Sciences, School of 
Business.  
1 ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 218 (High Court) (‘ACB 2015’); ACB v 
Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 918 (Court of Appeal) (‘ACB 2017’). 
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Singapore High Court2 rejected the plaintiff’s claim for the upkeep costs of 
raising the child on the basis of lack of causation between the plaintiff’s loss 
and the defendant’s negligence.3 On appeal, the Singapore Court of Appeal 
similarly rejected the upkeep claim, but solely on policy grounds.4 In an 
interesting turn, the Court of Appeal went further and created a completely 
new, independent category of loss — loss of genetic affinity — which 
reflected the lack of biological ties between the child and the parent at issue. 
The Court of Appeal recognised that a mother’s desire to have a child of her 
own with her husband is a ‘basic human impulse’ and that ‘its loss is keenly 
and deeply felt, even if it is difficult to put into words’.5  
The outcome of ACB means that parents now have a legally recognised 
interest in having genetic ties with their children, one that is protected under 
the law and compensable with damages in Singapore if violated. This article 
will examine the public policy considerations that were used in ACB as the 
basis for justifying the rejection of upkeep costs and the recognition of the 
new tort of genetic affinity. The role of policy in ACB is worthy of attention 
as courts in other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and Australia, 
have consistently been wary of relying on policy considerations to decide 
claims involving reproductive negligence. In this article, the author argues 
that the Court of Appeal’s decision in ACB was correctly made; it rightly 
embraced policy considerations in denying upkeep costs and recognising an 
interest in genetic affinity. 
II BACKGROUND  
A Facts of the Case 
The plaintiff was a Singaporean Chinese woman married to a German man of 
Caucasian descent. The first defendant, Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, was a 
private hospital. The second defendant, Thomson Fertility Centre Pte Ltd, was 
a fertility clinic that provided IVF services and was wholly owned by the first 
defendant. The third and fourth defendants were embryologists employed by 
                                                 
2 In Singapore, the High Court is the lower division of the Supreme Court of Singapore, the 
upper being the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal is Singapore’s highest judicial tribunal. 
For the Singapore court structure see Singapore Supreme Court, ‘Structure of the Court’ (Web 
Page) <https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/about-us/the-supreme-court/structure-of-the-
courts>. 
3 ACB 2015 (n 1) 226–7 [15]. 
4 ACB 2017 (n 1) 936 [24], 941 [37], 969 [101]. 
5 Ibid 980 [127]. 
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the second defendant. The plaintiff underwent IVF and delivered a daughter, 
Baby P. After birth, it was noticed that Baby P’s skin colour, hair and blood 
type were markedly different from those of the plaintiff and her husband. It 
was subsequently discovered that the plaintiff’s egg had been wrongly 
fertilised with the sperm of an unknown Indian donor, instead of those of her 
husband. The result was that Baby P was of mixed Chinese-Indian, instead of 
Chinese-Caucasian, ethnicity. Although Baby P was healthy, she was in no 
way biologically related to the plaintiff’s husband. 
The first defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of section 5(1) of the Private 
Hospitals and Medical Clinics Act (‘the Act’)6 for breaching the terms of its 
licence to provide assisted reproduction services and was fined SGD 20,000, 
the maximum permitted under the Act at that time.7 Subsequently, the 
plaintiff sued all the defendants in negligence. In the alternative the plaintiff 
also sued the second defendant for breach of contract. The parties’ contract 
included a promise to fertilise the plaintiff’s egg with her husband’s sperm. 
The plaintiff claimed damages for pain and suffering as well as mental 
distress arising from the mistaken use of the sperm of a third-party stranger, 
and the full upkeep costs of raising Baby P. The claim for upkeep costs 
included, among other things, the cost of enrolling Baby P in an international 
school in Beijing where the plaintiff and her husband were residing, the cost 
of tertiary education in Germany, necessities such as food and clothing until 
Baby P became financially self-reliant, medical and travel expenses, expenses 
associated with any hobbies and extra-curricular activities that Baby P might 
pursue, and the cost of employing an additional domestic helper until she 
started school.8  
 
                                                 
6 Private Hospitals and Medical Clinics Act (Singapore, cap 248, 1999 rev ed) s 5(1). 
7 ACB 2017 (n 1) 930 [9]. The alleged conduct in the statement of facts accompanying the 
charge was that the first defendant had processed two semen specimens inside one laminar 
hood at the same time, and had failed to ensure that the staff handling the specimens discarded 
the disposable pipettes that had been used after each step of processing. The lapses in 
procedures had contributed to the occurrence of a human error, which resulted in the mistaken 
use of sperm of a third-party stranger, instead of the sperm of the plaintiff’s husband. 
8 ACB 2015 (n 1) 221 [5]. The plaintiff had also initially sued the defendants for provisional 
damages (until such time as Baby P reached 35 years of age) for any damage arising from any 
genetic condition or disease that Baby P might have inherited as a result of the unknown 
donor’s genes. However, the plaintiff subsequently removed this claim via an amendment to 
the statement of claim: at 221–2 [6].  
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B Nature of the Claim 
The nature of the claim in ACB was wrongful fertilisation. Specifically, such a 
claim arises when  
assisted reproduction technology, usually IVF, is used and a claim is 
brought by the gestational mother … and/or her partner in circumstances 
where a healthcare professional uses the wrong gametes in the fertilisation 
procedure or where the ‘wrong’ embryo is implanted in the womb of the 
gestational mother and carried to term.9  
Wrongful fertilisation claims are to be contrasted with wrongful conception 
claims. The essence of the latter is that the parents never had the intention to 
have further children and, hence, the conception of the child is unplanned and 
not desired. Wrongful conception claims are typically brought by the child’s 
parents after a sterilisation operation has been performed negligently or after 
the parents have been improperly advised on the outcome of the operation, 
resulting in the unplanned and undesired birth of the child.10 The important 
distinction between ACB and wrongful conception cases was that the claim by 
the plaintiff in ACB was not that she did not want a child (in which case 
wrongful conception would have occurred) but rather that she did not want 
this particular child who was born out of the negligently performed IVF.11 
The essence of the plaintiff’s claim in ACB was that she ‘never planned to 
have this child (that is to say, the child who was born as a result of the use of 
the wrong genetic material) but instead planned for and desired to have a child 
with whom [the couple] would share genetic kinship’.12 
Wrongful fertilisation claims are also different from wrongful birth claims, as 
the negligent medical act in the latter takes place post-conception. The gist of 
a wrongful birth claim is that the child’s mother would have aborted the child 
if she had been informed early enough either that she was pregnant or that the 
foetus in the womb at such time had defects.13 Wrongful birth claims are 
typically brought by the parents and usually occur when a medical 
                                                 
9 ACB 2017 (n 1) 940 [34].   
10 Ibid 937–8 [29]. 
11 Ibid 940 [34] (emphasis added). See also Craig Purshouse, ‘Autonomy, Affinity, and the 
Assessment of Damages: ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 20 and Shaw v 
Kovak [2017] EWCA Civ 2018’ (2017) 26(4) Medical Law Review 675, 679.  
12 ACB 2017 (n 1) 940 [34] (emphasis in original).  
13 Ibid 937–8 [29]. See also Dean Stretton, ‘The Birth Torts: Damages for Wrongful Birth and 
Wrongful Life’ (2005) 10(1) Deakin Law Review 319, 320–48.  
2019 DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL FERTILISATION 143 
professional has failed to inform the mother of her pregnancy or properly 
advise that the baby would be born with birth defects.14  
In a general sense, however, all the above types of claims deal with the 
question of whether the expense associated with the unplanned and undesired 
birth of a child ought to be recognised as amounting to injury that is 
compensable under the law.15 
III THE DECISION IN ACB  
A Singapore High Court 
The Singapore High Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled in law to 
claim damages for the upkeep costs in either contract or tort.16 The matter was 
heard before Choo Han Teck J. His Honour first considered and rejected the 
submission by the plaintiff’s counsel that, had the plaintiff been told about the 
mistaken use of sperm, she would have been able to terminate the pregnancy, 
but that once the opportunity had passed, the defendants had to contemplate 
that someone else would be obliged to bring up Baby P.17 His Honour 
reasoned that this submission was a mere afterthought as the plaintiff had not 
pleaded her missed opportunity to abort Baby P.18 Even if the plaintiff had 
done so, there was no precedent or authority to support the plaintiff’s claim 
that damages could be sought in respect of a lost opportunity to seek an 
abortion.19 As observed in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (‘McFarlane’) 
(which is discussed in Part IVA below), to allow a claim for the lost 
                                                 
14 ACB 2017 (n 1) 937–8 [29]. 
15 Ibid. There is also another type of claim in reproductive negligence, being a ‘wrongful life’ 
claim which is made by a child for damage to him- or herself arising from the very fact of 
birth. This type of claim involves the child arguing that he or she should never have been 
born. The English courts have rejected ‘wrongful life’ claims because they violate the sanctity 
of human life: McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 1 QB 1166. See generally 
Stephen Todd, ‘Wrongful Conception, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life (2005) 27(3) 
Sydney Law Review 525, 537–41; Penelope Watson, ‘Edwards v Blomeley; Harriton v 
Stephens; Waller v James: Wrongful Life Actions in Australia’ (2002) 26(3) Melbourne Law 
Review 736, 745–8. 
16 ACB 2015 (n 1) 228 [17]. See generally Margaret Fordham, ‘An IVF Baby and a 
Catastrophic Error: Actions for Wrongful Conception and Wrongful Birth Revisited in 
Singapore’ (2015) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 232.  
17 ACB 2015 (n 1) 223–6 [10]–[14].   
18 Ibid 226 [14]. 
19 Ibid.  
144 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 24 
opportunity to have an abortion would be ‘going beyond what should 
constitute a reasonable restitution for the wrong done’.20  
In relation to the plaintiff’s substantive argument, Choo Han Teck J held that 
the upkeep claim must fail because the plaintiff had wanted a second child all 
along and was prepared to incur the expenditure involved in bringing up the 
second child (albeit one that she would conceive with her husband’s sperm).21 
His Honour reiterated that ‘Baby P was not an unwanted birth in the sense that 
the plaintiff mother did not want to have a baby at all. The plaintiff just 
wanted a baby conceived with her husband’s sperm’.22 Hence, it could not be 
said that the plaintiff and her husband had not contemplated having to incur 
expenditure to raise a child.23 In effect, his Honour concluded that there was 
no causation between the plaintiff’s loss and the defendant’s negligence since 
the plaintiff would still have incurred upkeep costs in raising a child in the 
absence of negligence.24 On this basis of lack of causation, his Honour held 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim damages for upkeep costs.25   
Albeit by way of obiter dictum, the High Court mentioned policy 
considerations. Choo Han Teck J expressed the view that, as a matter of 
public policy, upkeep costs should not be awarded.26 His Honour cited the 
words of Lord Millett in the House of Lords decision of McFarlane, stating 
that ‘[t]here is something distasteful, if not morally offensive, in treating the 
birth of a normal, healthy child as a matter for compensation’.27 To this, his 
Honour in ACB added two more specific concerns. The first was the 
detrimental impact that an award of damages might have on Baby P’s well-
being. In his Honour’s words, ‘[w]ere the plaintiff to succeed in her upkeep 
claim, whether in tort or in contract every cent spent in the upbringing of 
Baby P will remind her that it was money from a compensation for a 
mistake’.28 His Honour reiterated that ‘Baby P should not ever have to grow 
up thinking that her very existence was a mistake’.29 The second concern was 
                                                 
20 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (Scotland) [2000] 2 AC 59, 105 (Lord Clyde) (House of 
Lords) (‘McFarlane’).  
21 ACB 2015 (n 1) 226–7 [15]. 
22 Ibid 227 [16]. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid 228 [17]. 
26 Ibid 227 [16]; ACB 2017 (n 1) 933 [16]. See also Benny Tabalujan et al, Singapore Business 
Law (CommAsia Resources, 8th ed, 2018) 207–8. 
27 ACB 2015 (n 1) 227 [16], quoting McFarlane (n 20) 111 (Lord Millett). 
28 ACB 2015 (n 1) 227 [16]. 
29 Ibid. 
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that any such award of upkeep costs would contradict the concept of a parent-
child relationship since a parent is obliged to maintain his or her child.30 
Given that the plaintiff and her husband had accepted Baby P as their own and 
assumed the status of parents, they had to be taken to have accepted the 
responsibility of maintaining Baby P financially and in all other respects.31  
B Singapore Court of Appeal 
On appeal, the case was heard before a five-judge Singapore Court of Appeal, 
with the unanimous judgment delivered by Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA 
(Phang JA). In denying the upkeep costs, the Court of Appeal rejected the 
High Court’s reasoning on causation and relied solely on public policy 
grounds as the basis for its decision. Importantly, the Court of Appeal 
clarified that the difficult issue of whether upkeep costs were recoverable 
could not be dealt with simply as a matter of causation.32 The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that the fundamental error in the High Court’s analysis on causation 
was that it ignored the ‘purpose for which the expenses were (and would have 
been incurred)’.33 According to the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff’s purpose in 
seeking IVF was not ‘to beget a child irrespective of paternity (just so that she 
could have an addition to “her family unit”) but to have a child with her 
husband’.34 On that basis, the Court of Appeal concluded that it could not be 
said that ‘she or her [h]usband ever contemplated (let alone intended) having 
to raise a child that was not completely theirs’.35 
Having rejected the ‘no causation’ basis, the Court of Appeal had to grapple 
with the wide-ranging policy considerations concerning upkeep costs. Indeed, 
at the beginning of the ACB judgment, Phang JA foreshadowed the fact that 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 ACB 2017 (n 1) 944 [43]. 
33 Ibid 941–2 [38] (emphasis in original). It has been argued that the Singapore Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning with respect to causation departs from the traditional understanding of the 
‘but for’ test under the common law: Jordan English and Mohammud Jaamae Hafeez-Baig, 
‘ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd: Recovery of Upkeep Costs, Claims for Loss of Autonomy 
and Loss of Genetic Affinity: Fertile Ground for Development?’ (2018) 41(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 1360.   
34 ACB 2017 (n 1) 943–4 [41] (emphasis in original).  
35 Ibid. It also did not matter whether the upkeep claim was classified as an action for the 
recovery of pure economic loss or as one for the recovery of consequential economic loss 
because there is no general exclusionary rule against recovery for pure economic loss in 
Singapore: at 960 [82]. See also Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & 
Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR 100, 129 [69]. Thus, the characterisation of the upkeep 
claim cannot determine its success. 
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the decision would be much influenced by policy considerations. He was 
echoing the words of Griffiths LJ from the English Court of Appeal’s decision 
in McLoughlin v O’Brian, cited in the introduction of the ACB judgment, 
which states as follows: ‘[e]very system of law must set some bounds to the 
consequences for which a wrongdoer must make reparation … In any state of 
society it is ultimately a question of policy to decide the limits of liability’.36 
This is an interesting comment, showing that the Court of Appeal openly 
sought to rely on public policy arguments in ACB to deny upkeep costs. These 
arguments will be explored in greater depth in Part VB below.   
The Court of Appeal went further than denying compensation on policy 
grounds, creating a completely new, independent head of damage to 
compensate for the loss of genetic affinity, namely the lack of biological ties 
between the child and the parent at issue. In a world first, the Court of Appeal 
recognised the loss of genetic affinity as an independent actionable head of 
damage37 and a cognisable injury that should sound in damages.38 In defining 
the meaning of genetic affinity, the Court of Appeal observed the following:  
It is, at its core, a desire for identity bounded in consanguinity. The ordinary 
human experience is that parents and children are bound by ties of blood 
and share physical traits. This fact of biological experience — heredity — 
carries deep socio-cultural significance. For many, the emotional bond 
between parent and child is forged in part through a sense of common 
ancestry and a recognition of commonalities in appearance, temperament, 
and physical appearance.39 
The recognition of loss of genetic affinity by the Court of Appeal is not 
unexpected given that the outcome of the High Court’s decision had seemed 
unfair to the plaintiff. The High Court’s rejection of the upkeep claim  had 
failed to recognise that a substantial real harm had been done, leaving the 
plaintiff, who was a victim of gross medical negligence, with no remedy other 
                                                 
36 ACB 2017 (n 1) 927 [1], quoting McLoughlin v O’Brian [1981] 1 QB 599, 623, reversed in 
McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, although not on the point of policy considerations.  
37 ACB 2017 (n 1) 936 [24]. On the question of whether actionable damage ought to be dealt 
with as an issue concerning the existence of a duty of care or as a standalone requirement, the 
Court of Appeal clarified that so long as the policy factors are considered openly and 
explicitly, the same conclusion should still be reached irrespective of the approach: at 946–8 
[47]–[51]. For a general discussion of duty of care owed by medical authorities, see Anthony 
Gray, ‘The Liability of Providers of Mental Health Services in Negligence’ (2015) 20(2) 
Deakin Law Review 221. 
38 ACB 2017 (n 1) 984 [135]. In ACB, the Court of Appeal ultimately declined to grant punitive 
damages: at 991–1013 [153]–[209]. This article does not consider the Court of Appeal’s 
treatment of punitive damages. 
39 Ibid 981 [128].   
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than the damages for pain and suffering.40 The modest sum of damages for 
pain and suffering was in no way adequate to compensate for the real loss 
which the plaintiff had suffered as a result of the defendant’s negligence. The 
Court of Appeal, however, observed that there were practical difficulties with 
the assessment of damages for loss of genetic affinity and that there were ‘no 
comparable precedents (whether local or foreign) against which to draw 
appropriate comparisons’.41 The Court of Appeal eventually quantified the 
loss of genetic affinity as 30% of the full cost of raising Baby P, on the basis 
that the amount was ‘just, equitable and proportionate’ on the facts of the 
case.42 
IV REVIEW OF CASE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
As mentioned earlier, this is the first time a court in any jurisdiction has 
recognised that damage to a plaintiff’s interest in genetic affinity is a 
cognisable injury that should sound in damages. No court has previously 
decided an action alleging loss of genetic affinity. Accordingly, when the 
Court of Appeal in ACB considered the rights and remedies that would apply 
to such a case, it had to refer to other areas of the law in reproductive 
negligence for an appropriate analogy. This appropriate analogy is found in 
wrongful conception cases because they involve difficulties similar to those 
raised by an action for loss of genetic affinity, particularly the subjective 
nature of the injury and the difficulties in assessing damages. Furthermore, 
because wrongful conception claims do not necessarily involve unhealthy 
babies, they bear a strong resemblance to wrongful fertilisation cases such as 
ACB. More importantly, both types of case involve an invasion of subjective 
individual preferences regarding family formation and reproductive choice.  
As for claims for upkeep costs, courts have routinely declined to grant 
remedies for these when medical professionals are sued for negligence.43 
                                                 
40 ACB 2015 (n 1) 228 [17].  
41 ACB 2017 (n 1) 989 [148].   
42 Ibid 990 [150] (emphasis omitted).   
43 Professor Dov Fox classifies the procreative wrongs that stand to be righted into three 
categories: 1) the imposition of an unwanted pregnancy or parenting through professional 
negligence (eg, through the issuing of vitamins in place of birth control pills); 2) the 
deprivation of a wanted pregnancy or parenting through professional negligence (eg, through 
foetal misdiagnosis, leading to a pregnant woman’s decision to abort a wanted pregnancy; and 
3) negligent conduct that thwarts choices that parents have made about the characteristics of 
the baby they want. The third category of procreative wrongs includes mistakes in sperm-
sorting, gene-editing, and pre-implant genetic diagnoses. It is this third category into which a 
wrongful fertilisation claim such as that in ACB falls. Dov Fox, ‘Reproductive Negligence’ 
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Generally, policy considerations — the question of what public policy 
requires in the context of the case — have played an important role in the 
decisions, though the reliance on policy has frequently been subject to 
criticism (which will be further examined in Part IVA and IVB below). The 
policy considerations used by courts are many and varied but broadly they can 
be summarised as follows. First, a court may consider that an action to 
recover damages for the birth of a healthy child is morally wrong because the 
birth of a healthy child is considered a blessing, not an injury.44 Second, a 
court may consider that parents should not be allowed to recover damages for 
the ‘harm’ of an unwanted birth without offsetting an amount for the benefits 
of parenthood,45 and the difficulty of calculating such intangible benefits in 
monetary terms precludes recovery.46 Third, a court may consider that the 
recovery of upkeep costs may place an excessive burden on the medical 
profession and place doctors under pressure to encourage abortions in order to 
avoid claims for medical negligence which might arise if the child were 
allowed to be born.47 Finally, a court may consider that the psychological 
damage suffered by a child who subsequently finds out that he or she was 
‘unwanted’ makes the recovery of damages contrary to public policy.48  
Parts IVA to IVD below review the major cases involving claims of parents to 
recover the costs of raising a healthy child born as a result of medical 
negligence. While there have been many cases of wrongful conception, the 
only case of wrongful fertilisation (as identified by the Court of Appeal in 
ACB) was Andrews v Keltz (‘Andrews’),49 in which the subject of upkeep 
                                                                                                                    
(2017) 117(1) Columbia Law Review 149, 153. See also Carol Sanger, ‘The Lopsided Harms 
of Reproductive Negligence’ (2018) 118(1) Columbia Law Review Online <http://columbia 
lawreview.org/content/the-lopsidedharms-of-reproductive-negligence/>.  
44 See, eg, McFarlane (n 20) 114 (Lord Millet). It is noted that courts had, however, 
consistently rejected the view that even if parents suffer a loss as a result of the birth of a 
healthy child, they could have mitigated this damage by terminating the pregnancy or offering 
the baby for adoption. See ACB (n 1) 961 [84]–[85], citing McFarlane (n 20) 1317 (Lord 
Steyn): ‘it is “difficult to envisage any circumstances in which it would be right” to challenge 
the parents’ decision not to resort either to abortion or adoption’.  
45 See, eg, Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, 74 [199]–[201] (Hayne J) (‘Cattanach’).  
46 See, eg, ibid 56 [144] (Kirby J), 74 [200], 90 [248] (Hayne J), 129 [356] (Heydon J); 
McFarlane (n 20) 97 (Lord Hope).  
47 See, eg, Cattanach (n 45) 28 [57] (McHugh and Gummow JJ), 58 [149] (Kirby J), 106 [295] 
(Callinan J).  
48 See, eg, ibid 144 [399] (Heydon J).  
49 838 NYS 2d 363 (NY Sup Ct, 2007) (‘Andrews’). 
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costs was considered by a court in the United States (New York), albeit with a 
limited discussion of the issues at hand.50   
A United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords in McFarlane v Tayside Health 
Board held that the upkeep costs of raising a healthy child were 
irrecoverable.51 McFarlane was a wrongful conception action by the parents 
of an unwanted but healthy child who was conceived and born after the 
husband was misinformed, following a failed vasectomy, that he and his wife 
no longer needed to use contraceptives. First, the wife claimed £10,000 for the 
pain, suffering and distress resulting from the unwanted pregnancy. Second, 
the wife and husband claimed a sum of £100,000 for the cost of bringing up 
the child. At first instance, Lord Gill, dismissed the action with regard to both 
heads of claim. The basis of Lord Gill’s judgment was that ‘the privilege of 
being a parent is immeasurable in money terms; [and] that the benefits of 
parenthood transcend any patrimonial loss’.52 However, the Inner House 
allowed a reclaiming motion and reversed Lord Gill’s order, with the result 
that both heads of claim were recoverable on conventional principles of 
delict.53 On subsequent appeal, the House of Lords unanimously held that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover upkeep costs in relation to a healthy 
child. As for the wife’s pain, suffering and distress arising from the unwanted 
pregnancy, the House of Lords held that the claim was recoverable.54 
Importantly, the decision in McFarlane represents a rejection of the 
controversial ‘benefits rule’.55 This rule allows damages to be awarded for the 
maintenance of a child until he or she reaches majority, but requires a setoff 
of an amount intended to represent the benefits derived from parenthood.56 
                                                 
50 ACB 2017 (n 1) 939–40 [33].   
51 McFarlane (n 20). After McFarlane, there had been a number of cases involving recovery of 
costs associated with raising a disabled child. In Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University 
Hospital NHS Trust [2002] QB 266, the plaintiff was allowed to recover some of the costs of 
raising a disabled child, albeit that they were limited to the extra expense arising from the 
child’s disability. In Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309 
(‘Rees’), the House of Lords allowed the plaintiff to recover the additional expense associated 
with the difference between bringing up a healthy child and a disabled child. The decision in 
McFarlane was reaffirmed in Rees.  
52 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1997] SLT 211, 216.  
53 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1998] SLT 307, 308. 
54 McFarlane (n 20) 59–60. 
55 McFarlane (n 20). 
56 Ibid 81–82 (Lord Steyn). 
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Lord Millett concluded that the choice was between no recovery on the basis 
that the benefits outweigh any loss and full recovery on the basis that the 
benefits must not be considered, as they are immeasurable.57 Lord Clyde 
rejected the benefits rule on the grounds that to require a parent to 
demonstrate that their child was ‘more trouble than he or she is worth’ is 
undesirable.58 Lord Slynn’s reasoning for rejection was that it was too 
difficult to assess the benefits provided by a child.59 Lord Hope was of the 
opinion that considerations of fairness, justice and reasonableness required 
benefits to be taken into account, but that it was impossible to calculate such 
benefits.60 
While McFarlane supports the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in ACB, the 
judicial approach in the former is arguably more conservative than that in 
ACB. Despite the decisive unanimity of the decision, there were substantial 
differences in the approaches taken by the Law Lords in McFarlane. 
Consequently, there was no single line of reasoning in the case. Lord Millet’s 
analysis appeared to be policy-driven, whereas the other Law Lords subsumed 
the question of whether the upkeep costs should be recoverable under 
conventional principles, such as the existence of a duty of care and the 
categorisation of the claim as one for pure economic loss. Lord Millett 
admitted that, as a factual proposition, the birth of a child is a ‘mixed 
blessing’ since parenthood comes with its ups and downs;61 however, as a 
matter of legal policy, he held that ‘society itself must regard the balance as 
beneficial’.62 According to Lord Millet, ‘[i]t is morally offensive to regard a 
normal healthy baby as more trouble and expense than it is worth’.63 Allowing 
damages compensating for the wrong or injury arising from the birth of a 
healthy child is ‘morally repugnant’ and against public policy as the birth of a 
healthy child is a blessing and not a liability.64 Lord Millett further stressed 
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that the plaintiffs could not be allowed ‘by a process of subjective 
devaluation, to make a detriment out of a benefit’.65  
The remaining Law Lords in McFarlane adopted a more conventional 
approach and arrived at their decision based on ordinary principles of the law 
of negligence. Lord Slynn, Lord Hope and Lord Steyn examined whether the 
defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty of care to avoid the costs associated with 
the raising of the child at issue. Lord Slynn concluded that there was no duty 
of care because it would not be ‘fair, just or reasonable to impose on the 
doctor or his employer liability for the consequential responsibilities, imposed 
on or accepted by the parents to bring up a child’.66 Lord Slynn rejected the 
policy argument that an award of damages might cause the child to be 
psychologically affected after he or she learned that his or her birth was 
unwanted.67 He contended that unplanned conception was not uncommon and 
that children born as a result of ‘unwanted’ pregnancies frequently became 
accepted, eventually, as part of their families.68 Lord Slynn also rejected the 
argument that an award of upkeep costs would result in medical practitioners 
encouraging patients to have abortions. In his opinion, the ‘ethical standards 
of the medical profession (coupled with insurance)’ provided sufficient 
protection against such a possibility.69 Lord Hope likewise concluded that it 
would not be ‘fair, just or reasonable’ for the upkeep claim to succeed.70 Lord 
Steyn utilised similar reasoning but framed his discussion using the concept of 
‘distributive justice’ which, according to him, concerned the ‘just distribution 
of burdens and losses among members of a society’.71 An interesting aspect of 
Lord Steyn’s discussion of the notion of distributive justice is that, though he 
had explicitly decried the reliance on policy considerations in deciding the 
case, one can still see the influence of policy in his judgment.72 For example, 
Lord Steyn stated: ‘Instinctively, the traveller on the Underground would 
consider that the law of tort has no business to provide legal remedies 
consequent upon the birth of a healthy child, which all of us regard as a 
valuable and good thing’.73  
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Lord Clyde rejected the claim for upkeep costs because the restitution sought 
was disproportionate to the wrong done.74 His reasoning, in essence, was that 
awarding the costs of maintenance for a child who had been welcomed and 
accepted into the family did not accord with the idea of restitution.75 To allow 
the plaintiffs to enjoy the blessings of parenthood but be relieved of the 
obligations which it necessarily entails, would ‘[go] beyond what should 
constitute a reasonable restitution for the wrong done’.76 Lord Clyde further 
made it clear that policy considerations in support of one party were usually 
balanced by a countervailing argument in support of the other party, and that 
such considerations were therefore not sufficient to provide a basis for 
decision-making.77 On the whole, while the decision in McFarlane was 
ostensibly made on the basis of conventional negligence principles, it is clear 
that notions of public policy were considered by the Law Lords, albeit not 
expressly as the basis of the judgment.  
B Australia 
In contrast, in Cattanach v Melchior (‘Cattanach’),78 in a slim 4:3 majority 
decision, the High Court of Australia declined to follow the English position 
and awarded upkeep costs for the birth of a healthy but unwanted child in a 
wrongful conception case. In Cattanach, a sterilisation had been performed on 
only one fallopian tube, since the mother mistakenly believed her other tube 
had been removed when she was a child. The sterilising doctor had failed to 
investigate its presence and simply accepted the mother’s assurance that her 
right fallopian tube had been removed. As a result, the plaintiffs had ceased 
using contraception, thinking they could not conceive and, because the right 
fallopian tube was in fact still present, the mother conceived and subsequently 
gave birth to a healthy child. The parents sued the sterilising doctor and the 
State of Queensland (the latter as responsible for the hospital where the 
sterilisation occurred). Pregnancy and upkeep costs were awarded at first 
instance79 and upheld on appeal by the Queensland Court of Appeal.80 On 
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further appeal, the High Court confirmed that the upkeep costs were 
recoverable.81   
The majority of the High Court — consisting of McHugh and Gummow JJ in 
a joint judgment, Kirby J and Callinan J — was not persuaded by the policy 
considerations against recovery. The majority held that the defendant could be 
held liable on the application of ordinary principles of negligence and that 
there should be no set-off between upkeep costs and emotional benefits, since 
these affect different interests.82 In the opinion of McHugh and Gummow JJ, 
the plaintiffs’ loss was not ‘the coming into existence of the parent-child 
relationship’ but rather the expenditure that the plaintiffs had incurred or 
would incur in the future as a result of bringing up the ‘unplanned’ child.83 
Therefore, ‘[t]he unplanned child is not the harm for which recompense is 
sought … [I]t is the burden of the legal and moral responsibilities which arise 
by reason of the birth of the child that is in contention’.84 Since such 
expenditure was ‘causally connected to the defendant’s negligence’ and ‘the 
defendant [ought] to have reasonably foreseen that an expense of that kind 
might be incurred’, it should therefore be recoverable.85 It is notable that 
McHugh and Gummow JJ described the language of ‘wrongful birth’ as 
diverting attention away from the relevant wrongful act — the negligence of 
the doctor.86  
Kirby J similarly considered that it was not the birth of the child that 
constituted the injury for which the plaintiffs had sued; rather they had sued 
for the economic harm inflicted upon them by the injury they had suffered as 
a consequence of the doctor’s negligence.87 Kirby J characterised the upkeep 
claim not as a claim for pure economic loss but for loss that was consequential 
upon the physical damage of unwanted pregnancy.88 Hence, under ordinary 
principles of tort liability, since the loss had resulted from the doctor’s 
negligence, the burden of the loss fell on the doctor whose negligence was 
found to have caused the damage.89 Kirby J further cautioned against 
‘overwhelming legal analysis with emotion’.90 He noted that policy arguments 
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against full recovery, including those of the Cattanach minority (as discussed 
below), should be based on empirical evidence, not mere judicial assertion, 
which Kirby J noted had not been attempted in the case.91 Importantly, Kirby 
J observed that the award of damages did not necessarily entail a negative 
value judgment of the worth of the child.92 Callinan J held that the plaintiff’s 
economic loss was pure rather than consequential, commenting that the case 
was a ‘relatively simple one’ in which the requirements for pure economic 
loss had been met.93 Callinan J further found that the opposing policy 
arguments were unpersuasive.94 According to Callinan J, a judge’s personal 
‘distaste’ for assessing damages in an upkeep claim is no reason to decline 
such a claim if the application of legal principles allows recovery.95  
The minority (consisting of Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ), however, 
found that the recovery of upkeep costs in this case conflicted with serious 
policy concerns. The most significant policy argument advanced by the 
minority was that the birth of a child was incapable of characterisation as a 
loss. Heydon J emphasised that ‘human life is invaluable in the sense that it is 
incapable of valuation’ and, consequently, the parenthood duty which flows 
from the arrival of new human life is also ‘incapable of valuation or 
estimation or discharge by payment’.96 Heydon J further put forth various 
policy arguments against recovery, arguing that the majority’s view had failed 
to take into account the key values in family life and the type of litigation that 
would be likely to occur if recovery of upkeep costs were permitted.97 Hayne 
J considered that the benefits of parenthood must be taken into account in an 
assessment of damages, but that it would be hard to value the life of a child; 
hence the recovery of upkeep costs ought to be denied.98 Gleeson CJ viewed 
the actionable damage as the existence of the parent-child relationship arising 
from the wrongful conception, and considered such loss to be a pure 
economic loss arising out of a relationship that is incapable of valuation in 
financial terms.99 Gleeson CJ’s reasoning focused on the difficulties 
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associated with characterising the parent-child relationship as an injury 
capable of compensation.100  
Two judges of the majority, namely McHugh and Gummow JJ, in disagreeing 
with the minority’s policy arguments, pointed out that ‘the relevant damage 
suffered by the Melchiors is the expenditure that they have incurred or will 
incur in the future, not the creation or existence of the parent-child 
relationship’.101 Importantly, the majority also rejected the notion that the 
birth of a healthy child is always a blessing for which parents should receive 
no compensation. Kirby J pointed out in Cattanach that this argument 
‘represents a fiction which the law should not apply to a particular case 
without objective evidence that bears it out’.102 The notion of ‘blessing’ is an 
amorphous one and involves questions of a subjective nature. For example, 
how can this ‘blessing’ be measured objectively and accurately? What are the 
exact benefits that constitute such a ‘blessing’? Kirby J considered that the 
court is not the right forum for such value judgments.103 As a result, the 
majority’s view also represents the rejection of the ‘benefits’ argument: that 
the costs and hardships associated with an unwanted pregnancy must be offset 
by the benefits which flow naturally from the birth and life of a healthy child 
and necessarily outweigh the costs and hardships.104 
Another important policy argument in Cattanach (put forth by Heydon J) is 
that to allow a recovery of upkeep costs would encourage parents to act 
inconsistently with their parental duties by exaggerating the weaknesses and 
potential inadequacies of their children in order to maximise an award of 
damages.105 Similar to Heydon J, Hayne J was concerned with the 
undesirability of allowing parents to exaggerate the burden created by their 
child and thereby to discount the role of parental responsibility.106 Gleeson CJ, 
having categorised the case as one of pure economic loss,107 also indicated 
that policy considerations weighed against the recovery of upkeep costs.108 He 
warned of the potential indeterminacy of the liability for upkeep costs and 
accordingly considered that the recovery of upkeep costs should be denied 
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because normal tort principles do not permit recovery of indeterminate 
amounts for pure economic loss.109  
The policies that were considered to conflict with an award of upkeep costs 
were variously expressed by the minority, but they generally related to the 
worth that is to be ascribed to the life of a person, and the worth that can be 
found in a parent-child relationship. According to Heydon J, it is ‘morally 
offensive to regard a normal, healthy baby as more trouble and expense than it 
is worth’.110 Estimating a child’s financial value to its parents is contrary to 
public policy because it treats the child as a ‘commodity’.111 The life of the 
child has ‘worth’ in a sense quite distinct from the way commodities have 
‘worth’,112 and the ‘worth’ of the child is incapable of financial estimation.113 
The child would also be exposed to a considerable risk of harm if he or she 
were later to learn that the parents had in fact gone to court to get someone 
else to pay for the upkeep costs.114 A related policy argument put forth by the 
minority was that allowing recovery of upkeep costs would generate litigation 
which was bound to cause psychological harm in the later life of the child.115 
These policy arguments were, however, not sufficiently persuasive to the 
majority. McHugh and Gummow JJ considered that more evidence and a 
clearer understanding were required concerning these matters before recovery 
could be precluded on such policy grounds.116 Kirby J also substantiated his 
objection, stating that ‘[i]t is difficult to accept that children in today’s age 
learning such facts would not realise, if explained to them, that the claim was 
brought simply for the economic consequences of medical negligence’.117 
Furthermore, Kirby J described the idea that parents would be forced to 
denigrate their children publicly in order to maximise economic benefit as 
‘sheer judicial fantasy’.118 
The judges of the High Court in Cattanach openly discussed considerations of 
policy, though the majority was ultimately unpersuaded by the policy 
considerations raised. Importantly, the majority in Cattanach disapproved the 
reliance on policy considerations (as identified by the minority) to override 
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established principles of negligence. In particular, McHugh and Gummow JJ 
highlighted the danger of relying on policy considerations as justifications to 
award upkeep costs, stating that it is  
a beguiling but misleading simplicity to invoke the broad values which few 
would deny and then glide to the conclusion that they operate to shield the 
appellants from the full consequences in law of [the defendant’s] 
negligence.119  
McHugh and Gummow JJ further indicated that ‘the general considerations 
advanced by the appellants have not ... matured into a coherent body of legal 
doctrine’.120 Kirby J pointed out that a majority of the High Court had 
consistently rejected the ‘explicit reference to policy ... in resolving novel 
questions of negligence liability’ and, consequently, the use of policy in 
deciding the case should not be endorsed.121 Kirby J also spoke of the need for 
policy matters to be clearly enunciated if the application of ordinary legal 
principles is to be denied on the basis of public policy.122 
Subsequently, three Australian States moved to pass legislation to reverse the 
decision of the High Court in Cattanach.123 In Queensland, where the case 
originated, legislation was swiftly introduced to prohibit the award of 
damages for the costs ordinarily associated with maintaining a child.124 The 
effect of the decision in Cattanach has also been qualified in New South 
Wales and South Australia which have enacted legislation to disallow 
recovery of upkeep costs, thereby effectively reversing this decision of the 
High Court of Australia.125 In the remaining states and territories of Australia, 
the legal principles expounded in Cattanach remain good law.126 
C United States 
In the United States, recovery of upkeep costs is generally not permitted on 
public policy grounds. In Andrews v Keltz (‘Andrews’), a wrongful 
fertilisation case with facts similar to ACB, the New York Supreme Court held 
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that public policy precluded recovery for the ordinary costs of raising a 
healthy child.127 In Andrews, a native Dominican mother and a Caucasian 
father had undergone IVF to have a child who would be biologically their 
own. The plaintiff mother gave birth to a girl who was healthy, but who had 
skin, facial and hair characteristics different from both of the parents. It was 
subsequently discovered that the clinic had negligently used sperm other than 
the sperm of the plaintiff’s husband. The mother’s claim for upkeep costs was 
denied on public policy grounds. The Court did not, however, elaborate on its 
policy reasons for precluding recovery of the upkeep costs other than by 
making reference to its previous decisions in wrongful conception cases.128 
One such decision was O’Toole v Greenberg, in which the New York 
Supreme Court had stated: ‘[t]o hold that the birth of a healthy child 
represents a legal harm would be to engage this court in the jurisprudentially 
improper task of recasting the immutable, intrinsic value of human life 
according to the financial burden thus imposed upon the parents’.129 
Recognising the ‘“very nearly uniform high value” which the law and 
mankind have placed upon human life,’130 the New York Supreme Court 
concluded that ‘it cannot be said, as a matter of public policy, that the birth of 
a healthy child constitutes a harm cognizable at law’.131 The New York 
Supreme Court in Andrews further made reference to Weintraub v Brown 
(‘Weintraub’).132 The question to be resolved in that case was whether the 
parents of an unwanted, but otherwise healthy and normal, child may recover 
the ordinary costs of raising that child as damages resulting from the 
defendants’ negligence in the performance of a surgical birth control 
procedure. The New York Supreme Court in Weintraub concluded the 
following:  
As matter of public policy we are unable to hold that the birth of an 
unwanted but otherwise healthy and normal child constitutes an injury to 
the child’s parents and is, therefore, compensable in a medical malpractice 
action. Such a holding would be incompatible with contemporary views 
concerning one of life’s most precious gifts — the birth of a normal and 
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healthy child. We are loath to adopt a rule, the primary effect of which is to 
encourage, indeed reward, the parents’ disparagement or outright denial of 
the value of their child’s life.133  
D South Africa 
Recovery of upkeep costs in wrongful conception cases has, however, been 
allowed in South Africa. In Administrator, Natal v Edouard, the Appellate 
Division of South Africa upheld a decision of a lower court awarding 
damages to the plaintiff for upkeep costs, but denying a claim for pain and 
suffering.134 In that case, the plaintiff had sought damages from the defendant 
hospital for the costs of raising a healthy child born subsequent to a failed 
sterilisation. The Appellate Division upheld the award of upkeep costs on the 
basis that the hospital whose negligence had brought about such an undesired 
birth ought to be liable for all the expenses that went along with raising that 
child, being expenses that the parents would not have incurred had it not been 
for the negligence of others.135 Furthermore, the Appellate Division also saw 
no basis for believing that such recovery would interfere with the sanctity of 
the parent-child relationship. It did, however, limit the recovery of upkeep 
costs to a situation where the parents were suffering economic hardship 
(which the Appellate Division found not to be the case here).136  
The Appellate Division’s detailed explanation137 for its rejection of the 
appellant’s policy arguments is worth some discussion here. First, in response 
to the policy argument that the birth of a healthy child cannot be regarded as a 
legal wrong, the Appellate Division clarified that the wrong is not the 
unwanted birth, but the negligence of others that led to financial loss. Second, 
the appellant had argued that the financial burden of having to maintain a 
child is outweighed by the benefits of parenthood; hence it was argued that 
the birth of a child is a blessing on the whole. The Appellate Division rejected 
the argument, stating that there is no legal basis in South Africa to require 
nonpecuniary benefits to be offset against the plaintiff’s loss. The law requires 
a set off only in a case of tangible benefits, such that tangible benefits 
accruing as a result of a breach of contract or the commission of a tort are set 
off against the loss suffered by a plaintiff. Third, the Appellate Division 
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further rejected the policy argument that it would be highly undesirable for 
any child to learn that a court had publicly awarded damages to his or her 
parents because the child’s birth was a mistake. The Appellate Division 
reasoned that the possibility of the child finding out about the judgment in his 
or her later life was remote. Lastly, the Appellate Division also disagreed with 
the view that an award of damages for upkeep costs would transfer the 
obligation to support and maintain the child from its parents to the defendant. 
In particular, the Appellate Division did not consider that such recovery 
interferes with the sanctity accorded by law to the parent-child relationship. 
According to the Appellate Division, the award of damages does not 
extinguish the parents’ obligation to maintain the child, but at best enables 
them to fulfil it.  
V POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN ACB 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal in ACB held that the claim for upkeep costs 
should be disallowed on public policy grounds and that the public policy 
concerns in relation to a recovery of upkeep costs remained the same, 
regardless of whether the action was in contract or in tort.138 The Court of 
Appeal further created a new tort by allowing the plaintiff to recover for the 
loss of genetic affinity. In ACB, although the Court of Appeal expressly based 
its decision on public policy considerations, it was silent on whether the 
reliance on policy grounds in its judicial reasoning was appropriate and 
justified. As seen in the decision in McFarlane, although notions of public 
policy were considered in the case, ultimately the Law Lords preferred to rest 
their decision on conventional negligence principles. Further, in Cattanach, 
the majority strongly objected to the use of policy considerations as the basis 
for its decision. In the words of Kirby J in this case,  
[j]udges ... have no authority to adopt arbitrary departures from basic 
doctrine … Least of all may they do so, in our secular society, on the 
footing of their personal religious beliefs or ‘moral’ assessments concealed 
in an inarticulate premise dressed up, and described, as legal principle or 
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legal policy.139  
This raises the question of whether the Court of Appeal in ACB had the legal 
authority to base its decision on public policy considerations and, 
consequently, whether the decision in ACB runs contrary to the long-standing 
view that there is little room for public policy reasoning in private law 
adjudication. This issue is discussed below and the view is taken that the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in ACB was correctly made.  
A Role of Public Policy in Judicial Decisions  
The core of the concept of public policy is that it involves arguments about 
the public or common good. However, the reliance on policy considerations in 
judicial decision-making has been a controversial topic. Public policy has 
long been regarded as an elusive concept. Burrough J in Richardson v Mellish 
famously described it as a ‘very unruly horse, and when once you get astride 
it you never know where it will carry you’.140 Courts often face the difficult 
interplay between law and public policy in the determination of a particular 
case. Moreover, courts are wary of relying on public policy in judicial 
reasoning because it is often seen as a ‘cover for uncertain reasoning’.141  
The objection to reliance on public policy in judicial decision-making is 
attributed to two main factors.142 First, the logic of public policy cuts against 
the logic of the judicial adjudication, especially in cases involving a dispute 
between private individuals.143 Whereas public policy focuses on what is good 
for the public or common good, the purpose of judicial adjudication is to 
correct the injustice between the parties in the particular dispute.144 Hence, if 
viewed in that context, public policy arguments which deal with the common 
good are not relevant to the arguments concerning the justice of the particular 
case that is before the court. Second, what is or is not for the public or 
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common good is often not a matter of complete consensus and changes with 
the times.145 Thus, ‘[p]ublic policy does not admit of definition and is not 
easily explained … [P]ublic policy is a variable quantity … [I]t must vary and 
does vary with the habits, capacities, and opportunities of the public’.146 
Accordingly, in using policy considerations in judicial decision-making, 
courts should justify their taking into account the common good when 
adjudicating a dispute between private parties, and their reliance on such 
policy considerations as an authoritative or persuasive basis for their ruling. 
What these justifications are would depend on the legal context of the case 
before the court.  
Public policy arguments permeate every area of the law, including tort law, 
albeit in different ways and to different degrees. They may also be used to 
justify the existence and scope of a claimed right. For example, when the 
court is deciding whether to recognise a new tort, it considers whether doing 
so would be justified by considerations of public policy.147 The challenge of 
public policy is that it requires courts to balance the common good and 
individual justice. Society is changing faster than laws can adapt. Rapid 
developments in technology have created possibilities for medical treatment 
and procedures that raise complex moral and ethical issues. Reproductive 
negligence, which was in issue in ACB, is one example. Other areas 
frequently involving moral and ethical dilemmas include commercial 
surrogacy148 and same-sex marriages.  
The matter of addressing public policy considerations was once again before 
the Singapore High Court when it decided the recent case of UKM v Attorney-
General (‘UKM’),149 involving an application by a Singaporean gay man to 
adopt his biological son who was conceived using the applicant’s sperm and 
the egg of an anonymous donor, and then birthed by a surrogate mother in the 
United States. In allowing the applicant’s adoption of his son, the Singapore 
High Court carefully threaded the needle to conclude that it was in the child’s 
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interests to be adopted by the applicant. While the outcome of this particular 
case may be worth celebrating, the broader significance of the judgment is 
that the Singapore High Court took the opportunity to discuss the role of 
public policy in judicial reasoning and set out a structured approach towards 
the treatment of public policy arguments in the courts. Under this approach, 
the two factors — ‘type of law’ and ‘type of public policy’ — form a matrix 
of legal contexts.150 The first axis — resting on the distinction between judge-
made law and statutory law — identifies the constitutional constraints upon 
judicial policy-making, whereas the second axis — resting on the distinction 
between socio-economic policy and legal policy — identifies practical 
constraints placed on judicial policy-making.151 Generally, legal policy 
involves arguments about the common good that relate to the conduct and 
consequences of legal practice, whereas socio-economic policy involves 
arguments about what would be good for society, especially from a social, 
economic, cultural and political perspective.152 Depending on where a case is 
placed in this matrix, the court will face a combination of constitutional and 
practical constraints on its ability to rely on public policy considerations in its 
judicial decision-making.  
ACB is a case involving judge-made law, and the public policy in question is 
socio-economic in nature. For this reason, the court may, as a general rule, 
rest its decision on public policy, subject to the constraints of precedent, 
established principles, and the analogical reasoning of the common law.153 In 
this context, the court has effectively been delegated the responsibility for 
making and changing the law, and therefore must adjudicate matters not only 
with the individual case in view, but also with the common good in mind.154 
The court’s power to establish the law on the basis of public policy 
considerations is, however, limited in at least three ways.155 First, the ‘bipolar 
structure of the private law’ requires the court to reconcile any community 
interests that it takes into consideration with the need to do justice between 
the disputing parties.156 Second, the principles established by the court remain 
subject to legislative overruling.157 Third, the court may in an appropriate case 
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decide that a change in the law would represent such a significant 
development that legislative action would be more appropriate than judicial 
lawmaking.158  
B Policy Considerations in Denying Upkeep Costs 
In ACB, the Court of Appeal was persuaded by two main policy arguments in 
denying upkeep costs.  
1 The Obligations of Parenthood 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that ‘[t]he obligation to maintain one’s child is 
an obligation at the heart of parenthood and cannot be a legally cognisable 
head of loss’.159 The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the upkeep 
claim is maintainable simply on the application of the conventional principles 
of civil liability, which was the majority view in Cattanach. In Cattanach, the 
High Court of Australia had viewed a claim for upkeep costs as similar in 
principle to a claim for damages for pain and suffering, since the former can 
be considered as the last link in the concatenation of obligation, breach, 
causation, foreseeability and damage that forms the chain of civil liability in 
the law of negligence.160 The Court of Appeal in ACB, however, adopted a 
different view, clarifying that the case was in essence  
not about the direct consequences to the [plaintiff] qua patient of the 
physical and other aspects of pregnancy and birth; rather, it is about the 
consequences to the [plaintiff] qua mother of the existence of the child and 
the concomitant creation of a relationship pursuant to which there are legal, 
moral, and social obligations to care for, support, and nurture Baby P.161  
Importantly, the Court of Appeal focused more broadly ‘on the notion of 
parenthood as an institution’ arising out of the relationship between a parent 
and a child.162 At the core of this relationship lies each parent’s ‘independent 
and non-derogable duty to maintain his/her children, whether directly, through 
the provision of such necessities as the child may need, or indirectly, by 
contributing to the cost of providing such necessities’.163  
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When upkeep claims are pursued, relief is sought in respect of the parental 
duty to maintain the child, and their success therefore necessarily depends on 
the recognition of parenthood obligations as actionable damage.164 However, 
this was not a logical step that the Court of Appeal in ACB was prepared to 
take. The duty to maintain one’s child lies at the very heart of parenthood and 
thus expenses associated with the discharge of this parenthood duty are not 
capable of characterisation as a loss.165 Importantly, the Court of Appeal 
emphasised that this was a ‘normative claim about the paradigm of family 
relationships which exists in the law’166 and ‘the meaning of legal 
parenthood’.167 In the words of Phang JA, parenthood comprises ‘an 
indivisible bundle of rights and obligations which cannot be peeled away and 
hived off à la carte … [T]he obligations of parenthood are fundamental, 
indivisible, and incapable of sounding in damages’.168 Notably, Phang JA 
reasoned that the plaintiff could not argue, on the one hand, that she and her 
husband had accepted Baby P as their own and yet, on the other hand, be 
allowed to argue that they could not accept the obligation of maintaining the 
child.169 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal in ACB was unconvinced by the 
argument (which courts such as the High Court in Cattanach had relied upon) 
that what was counted as loss was not the unplanned child per se, but the 
unplanned and unwanted financial expenses arising from the child’s birth. The 
Court of Appeal reasoned that, while such an argument might be a possible 
answer to the objection that the upkeep claim results in the denigration of the 
worth of the child, it is not an adequate justification for overriding the notion 
that no parent can claim a legal entitlement to be free from the responsibilities 
of parenthood, whether financial or otherwise.170    
2 Inconsistency with the Nature of the Parent-Child 
Relationship 
Recovery of upkeep costs would also be ‘fundamentally inconsistent with the 
nature of the parent-child relationship and would place the [plaintiff] in a 
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position where her personal interests as a litigant would conflict with her 
duties as a parent’.171 The Court of Appeal noted that, to pursue such a claim, 
parents would have to testify in court that their child represented a net loss to 
them. This would encourage the ‘exaggeration of any infirmities and the 
diminution of benefits as might exist in their children’.172 In the event that 
recovery were to be permitted, then one would need to decide if some form of 
set-off would need to be made for the benefits brought by the child. It should 
be noted that, in Singapore, children have a legal obligation pursuant to the 
Maintenance of Parents Act173 to financially support their parents in old age. 
Consequently, if some form of off-setting were to be done, then the ‘unseemly 
spectacle of parents disparaging the “value” of their children or the degree of 
their affection for them in open court’ would seem a real possibility.174 Such a 
situation would clearly be inconsistent with the parent-child relationship.175 It 
would also lead to the undesirable outcome that ‘little or no damages would 
be awarded for loving mothers and fathers while generous compensation 
would be obtained by those who disparage and reject their child’.176 The Court 
of Appeal further noted that even if off-setting were disallowed, this would at 
most prevent parents from downplaying the benefits which their children 
bring; however, the fact would remain that parents may still have the 
incentive to emphasise the detriments brought about by the child in order to 
maximise the award of damages.177 The Court of Appeal was of the view that 
such possibilities were not merely fanciful concerns. Allowing recovery of an 
upkeep claim was therefore held to be ‘fundamentally at odds with the 
overarching duty that parents have to provide, care for, and love their 
children’.178  
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C Policy Considerations in Compensating Loss of 
Genetic Affinity 
In ACB, the Court of Appeal embarked on an extensive analysis of the 
concept of an award for loss of autonomy but ultimately did not recognise loss 
of autonomy as an actionable interest in its own right, though it acknowledged 
the relevance of autonomy as an important background consideration.179 The 
Court of Appeal viewed the concept of autonomy, being the loss of the 
opportunity to live the life one has planned, as being ‘too nebulous and too 
contested a concept to ground a claim’.180 The Court of Appeal noted that the 
plaintiff did suffer a severe dislocation of her reproductive plans, constituted 
principally by the ‘fracture of biological parenthood’;181 however, it 
considered that to classify the damage simply as a ‘loss of autonomy’ would 
be too general.182 Furthermore, the Court of Appeal’s reluctance to recognise 
the plaintiff’s loss as a form of loss of autonomy was due to the concern that 
such recognition would ‘undermine existing control mechanisms which keep 
recovery in the tort of negligence within sensible bounds’.183  
The question then is whether some other forms of loss might be recoverable. 
Up till this point, it would seem that the Court of Appeal’s rejection of the 
upkeep claim without more had failed to recognise that a substantial real harm 
had been done, leaving the plaintiff with no remedy other than the damages 
for pain and suffering.184 Such an outcome would not correct the injustice 
suffered by the plaintiff. Importantly, rejecting the upkeep claim on public 
policy grounds without granting further relief to the plaintiff runs contrary to 
what the ‘bipolar structure of the private law’ achieves, that is, to reconcile 
any community interests that it takes into consideration with the need to do 
justice between the disputing parties.185 The Court of Appeal’s decision to 
allow the novel claim based on loss of genetic affinity therefore is a legally-
justified, fair and viable approach, providing adequate compensation to the 
deserving plaintiff in ACB, while taking into account the public policy 
concerns associated with the recovery of upkeep costs. Genetic affinity is an 
entirely new standard, and the Court of Appeal ought to be commended for 
compellingly justifying the recognition of the value put on biological 
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relationships and taking into account good and persuasive policy 
considerations.186  
1 Loss of Chance to Have a Family Structure Which 
Comports with Her Aspirations 
In ACB, the Court of Appeal identified the real loss suffered by the plaintiff as 
the loss of chance ‘to have a family structure which comports with her 
aspirations’.187 Importantly, such loss involves the loss of the ordinary human 
experience of a parent sharing ties of blood and physical traits with the 
child.188 The choice to undergo IVF is often motivated by a ‘deeply felt 
longing for a child of one’s own’.189 Ethicist Leon Kass has described this 
longing as ‘a couple’s desire to embody, out of the conjugal union of their 
separate bodies, a child who is flesh of their separate flesh made one’.190 
Having one’s own child can be narrowly interpreted to mean having one’s 
own genetic material in the offspring191 but it also suggests an older concept 
called consanguinity, which is defined as ‘kinship; blood relationship; the 
connection or relation between persons descended from the same stock or 
common ancestor’.192 In other words, the notion of genetic affinity goes 
beyond correct or desired genetic mix, and should be viewed broadly to 
include the personal and cultural significance of genetic or biological 
connections with one’s offspring. This could cover the following parental 
desires.193 First, a couple desiring genetic affinity may wish their children to 
be literal, physical manifestation of the parental union. Second, it could be 
that the couple desires to have children who share a common ancestry with 
the parents, particularly where that shared ancestry is of deep cultural 
significance. Lastly, the desire to have children with whom one shares 
physical traits may reflect a desire to undergo the ‘normal’ parenthood 
experience.194 These desires are met through what can be collectively referred 
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to as ‘genetic affinity’, and the Court of Appeal in ACB rightly concluded that 
the loss suffered by the plaintiff was the result of a ‘complex amalgam of 
biological, social, ethical, and historical factors’.195 In ACB, the Court of 
Appeal further clarified the fact that the interest in genetic affinity not only 
involves the ties between the parents and the child, but also the parents’ 
relationship with their extended relations; the child’s relationship with his/her 
siblings; as well as the family’s relationship with the wider community.196 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal in ACB was careful to clarify that it was not 
laying out a ‘prescriptive definition of what a family should be’ nor setting 
out ‘to denigrate adoption’ which would not involve genetic or biological 
connectedness.197 Often, persons who consciously choose to undergo IVF do 
so ‘because of a deep desire to experience, as far as possible, the ordinary 
experience of parenthood’.198 This was exactly what the plaintiff in ACB had 
been denied due to the negligence of others, and the plaintiff’s loss, resulting 
in the fracture of biological parenthood, was rightly identified by the Court of 
Appeal as a legal wrong that ought to be compensated at law.  
However, the characterisation of the damage as loss of genetic affinity could 
well be open to challenge. Arguably, the ruling in ACB could be taken broadly 
to mean that recovery of loss is possible in a scenario where a woman desired 
to undergo IVF with sperm from a donor of her choosing (not her husband), 
but instead conceived with sperm from a different donor. In such a case, it 
may be argued that the woman’s interest in having a child with the particular 
donor ought to be legally recognised and protected. This raises a complication 
as courts in Singapore may in future have to assess which familial aspirations 
are worthy of legal protection. This is particularly so given the outcome in 
UKM in which the Singapore High Court allowed a Singaporean gay father’s 
appeal to adopt his biological son conceived and carried by a surrogate 
mother. UKM effectively allowed the father to bring up his son in a family 
unit with his long-term same-sex partner. In the light of UKM (but remaining 
faithful to the law’s recognition and protection of marriage as an institution), 
one must wonder whether the ACB decision might be taken to mean that 
courts in Singapore would adopt a more liberal view of what ‘familial 
aspirations’ entail. It would be interesting to see further case law development 
in this area. 
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Another aspect of the ACB judgment that is open to challenge is the Court of 
Appeal’s suggestion that the plaintiff had an interest in maintaining the 
integrity of her reproductive plans.199 Specifically, the Court reiterated that the 
plaintiff’s right to have a child with her husband to ‘maintain an 
intergenerational genetic link’ and to maintain ‘affinity’ should be recognised 
under the law.200 On this basis, it would appear that the interest in genetic 
affinity also includes an interest in maintaining the integrity of a person’s 
reproductive plans. This raises the question of whether the Court is effectively 
protecting the plaintiff’s right to choose the person with whom she plans to 
have a child.201 The Court of Appeal, however, left open the question of 
whether claimants in future wrongful birth and wrongful conception cases 
could potentially sue for damages on the basis that their interest in 
maintaining their reproductive plans ought to also be legally protected.  
2 Profound Social and Emotional Consequences  
In identifying the harm suffered by the plaintiff in ACB, the Court of Appeal 
also recognised the profound social and emotional consequences arising from 
Baby P’s lack of any genetic link to the plaintiff’s husband.202 The lack of 
legal precedents in the area of wrongful fertilisation meant that the Court of 
Appeal in ACB had to draw on cases in the broader category of wrongful 
births that had discussed the significance of ‘affinity’ in their judgment. The 
most notable case was the Northern Irish case of A and B by C (their mother 
and next friend) v A – Health and Social Services Trust (‘A and B’), a case 
involving wrongful fertilisation.203 In A and B, the plaintiffs were twins born 
from a negligently performed IVF, resulting in them having darker skin than 
their parents and different skin colours from each other as well. The plaintiffs 
subsequently sued for damages, on the basis that, as a result of their different 
skin colours, they had to endure ‘abusive and derogative comment and hurtful 
name calling from other children,’ which led them to suffer from emotional 
distress.204 At first instance, Gillen J dismissed the suit on the ground that a 
difference in skin colour could not constitute a legally recognisable form of 
actionable damage.205 Gillen J explored the policy considerations that would 
                                                 
199 Ibid 984 [135]. 
200 Ibid. 
201 See, eg, English and Hafeez-Baig (n 33).    
202 ACB 2017 (n 1) 984 [136]. 
203 A and B by C (their mother and next friend) v A – Health and Social Services Trust [2011] 
NICA 28 (‘A and B 2011’); A (A Minor) and B (A minor) by C (Their Mother and Next 
Friend) v A Health and Social Services Trust [2010] NIQB 108 (‘A and B 2010’).  
204 A and B 2010 (n 203) [5].   
205 Ibid [31]–[32], [34]. 
2019 DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL FERTILISATION 171 
be involved if compensation were to be awarded to the plaintiffs. As 
expressed by Gillen J, ‘[i]n a modern civilised society the colour of their skin 
— no more than the colour of their eyes or their hair or their intelligence or 
their height — cannot and should not count as connoting some damage to 
them’.206 Furthermore, it is important that ‘children of all colours, shapes and 
sizes must be afforded equality of opportunity free from the burdens of racial 
or ethnic discrimination’.207 Accordingly, the High Court of Northern Ireland 
concluded that the award of damages would be contrary to the policy 
considerations underlying a multi-cultural society.208 On appeal, the decision 
was upheld by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal on the same basis that a 
difference in skin colour could not constitute a form of actionable damage.209  
While the Court of Appeal in ACB agreed with the outcome in A and B, it 
appeared to suggest that the claim in A and B, if crafted differently, might 
have allowed the recovery of damages on the basis of ‘profound social and 
emotional consequences which will persist for years to come’ as a result of 
the difference in the children’s skin colour from their parents’.210 This 
approach would recognise the ‘true harm that was suffered’ by the plaintiffs 
in A and B.211 However, the particular kinds of physical and/or racial traits 
that the parents might desire or not desire would appear to be the very 
characteristics that would constitute illegitimate grounds of discrimination.212 
In this regard, the Court of Appeal in ACB was careful not to condone racism 
but recognised that it is a social reality in Singapore that needed to be faced 
(since Singapore is not yet to be considered a post-racial society).213 In ACB, 
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part of the plaintiff’s claim concerned the stigma and misunderstanding that 
she and her husband would face due to Baby P having Indian blood and a 
markedly different complexion from them. The Court of Appeal emphasised 
that the recognition of a racial component in its judgment was not intended as 
‘judicial sanction for any partiality for single-race families’ but rather as an 
acknowledgment of the ‘complex role that physical resemblance, race, and 
cultural and ethnic identity’ play in ‘individual well-being’.214 Nonetheless, 
one may still wonder whether the damages might have been different if the 
defendant clinic had instead mistakenly used the sperm of a donor of the same 
race as the plaintiff’s husband. This leaves open the question of how much 
physical and/or racial traits should be factored into the assessment of 
damages. In hindsight, might it have been less controversial if the Court of 
Appeal had drawn less attention to the racial component in ACB?  
3 Significance of Genes  
By allowing the claim for a loss of genetic affinity, the Court of Appeal in 
ACB also necessarily affirmed that genes do play a role in determining a 
child’s personal identity and traits. Although it has been said that the public 
has limited knowledge regarding genetics,215 past studies show that people 
tend to readily offer genetic explanations to explain people’s behaviours.216 
People also tend to believe that traits with a genetic basis are immutable.217 It 
has also been said that people’s understanding of genetics influences the way 
they live their lives, resulting in a strong emphasis placed by society on 
genetic relatedness.218 This is essentially the ‘nature’ versus ‘nurture’ debate 
propounded by Professor Norton.219 Questions about the degree to which 
genetic factors genuinely influence personal traits remain the subject of 
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controversy.220 If desired characteristics are not genetically influenced, but 
rather influenced by environmental factors, it would undermine the legitimacy 
of placing any significance on genes in determining a person’s traits.   
The judgment in ACB also occurs at an interesting juncture in an era where 
constant advances in the area of genomics and procreative technologies are 
gaining traction in the medical field. In 2015, the United Kingdom became the 
first country to legalise Mitochondrial Genome Replacement Technology 
(‘MGRT’),221 sometimes called ‘three-parent IVF’, which focuses on the 
prevention of the transmission of mitochondrial disorders from a mother to 
her child. MGRT substitutes the faulty DNA in a mother’s egg with healthy 
DNA from a healthy donor. While the United Kingdom has permitted the use 
of MGRT in clinical research, the technology is not allowed in most other 
countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United 
States.222 In ACB, the Court of Appeal did not extend its reasoning to 
expressly recognise a right to genetic affinity. However, given its recognition 
of an interest in genetic affinity, one can put forth a plausible argument that 
the prohibition of the use of ‘three-parent IVF’ violates individuals’ 
procreative rights, grounded in individuals’ interest in genetic affinity.223 
Further, in a jurisdiction that allows MGRT, what if, for example, a mother, 
upon finding out that she had a severe mitochondrial disease, underwent the 
‘three-parent IVF’ to prevent transmission of her particular faulty DNA to her 
child, but it failed? Could the mother institute an action for the child’s genes 
being incorrect, and hence the loss of genetic affinity?   
The same argument may also be made in the context of surrogacy. Currently, 
entering a surrogacy contract is not a criminal offence in Singapore, and there 
are no sanctions against contracting with a surrogate either in Singapore or 
overseas.224 However, medical institutions and professionals in Singapore are 
prohibited from offering surrogacy arrangements.225 In light of UKM and with 
the recognition of an interest in genetic affinity in ACB, one may similarly 
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make a plausible argument that the prohibition of surrogacy arrangements 
violates individuals’ procreative rights, and hence their interest in having 
genetic affinity with their children. If an interest in genetic affinity is to be 
valued, a woman who faces a risky pregnancy or is unable to carry a 
pregnancy should be allowed to engage a gestational carrier who will then 
carry the child to full term. In such a case, the child will be born with the 
parents’ genes, and the gestational carrier has no biological relation to the 
child. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In what was described as ‘one of the most difficult cases’ that had come 
before the Singapore Court of Appeal, ACB has raised mixed reactions and 
debate. However, overall the judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal has 
more merits than flaws and is to be commended. Indeed, taking into account 
all the circumstances, the Court of Appeal has taken a legally justified and 
pragmatic approach to the issues raised by the case, relying on policy 
considerations to underscore the fundamental importance of biological 
relationships, and ensuring that adequate remedies can be awarded to 
deserving plaintiffs in cases of medical negligence in the provision of IVF.  
